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book’s epilogue reminds the reader that the 
U.S. Navy has a continuing need for small, 
fast warships and daring sailors willing to 
operate them against larger opponents.
Readers will appreciate the way the author 
uses oral histories, letters, newspaper 
accounts, deck logs, military after-
action reports, written recollections, and 
background books and articles to tell an 
engaging sea story. This historical narrative 
will satisfy World War II buffs, sailors, and 
casual-interest readers. It is a quick and 
enjoyable read. Military scholars might ap-
preciate the focused examination of small 
boats. Domagalski deftly accomplishes his 
mission: to pay homage to the intrepid war-
fighting spirit of the patrol boat and motor 
torpedo boat sailors of World War II.
EDWARD GILLEN
Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 
1949, by M. Taylor Fravel. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2019. 392 pages. $35.
During the Cold War, naval professionals 
working to understand Soviet military 
doctrine could call on a well-developed 
body of literature. Authoritative Western 
academic studies covered everything from 
the Soviets’ overall strategic design to their 
philosophy of troop leadership. Advanced 
students could call on textbooks from 
Soviet military colleges in translation. 
Taken together, these works were essential 
to understanding that the Soviet military 
viewed warfare through a philosophical 
lens fundamentally different from our own.
Today, professionals trying to understand 
the modern Chinese approach to warfare 
find comparatively meager fare. Western 
academic interest in the approaches 
taken by the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) to military strategy waned after the 
Maoist era. In many key areas, primary 
sources are scarce—often passed from 
practitioner to practitioner rather than 
being widely available. While a few 
overview works exist, there has been 
little focused academic analysis of the 
basics of Chinese military science.
In that context, Taylor Fravel’s volume on 
PRC military strategy represents a ground-
breaking contribution to Chinese military 
studies. In Active Defense, Fravel analyzes 
the nine “strategic guidelines” the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has issued since 
1949. Each strategic guideline provided 
Chinese forces with four key elements: an 
authoritative analysis of the Chinese stra-
tegic situation, an explanation of warfare 
in the present era, and direction for both 
force development and force employment. 
Three of these documents—those issued 
in 1956, 1980, and 1993—each represented 
a major shift in direction for the PLA. 
Rebutting those who see the PLA as 
isolated and insular, Fravel concludes that 
these three revisions were driven primarily 
by PLA perception of significant shifts in 
the conduct of modern warfare. While in 
each case the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) wrote the overall analysis of the 
strategic situation—which is, at its core, 
a political assessment—the other three 
component parts of each strategic guidance 
document represented military judgments. 
Fravel suggests that such fundamental 
reassessments are possible only when the 
party leadership is internally unified and 
thus able to delegate this kind of work to 
its military experts. Many Western readers, 
focused on CCP control of the PLA, will be 
surprised at this long-standing empower-
ment of the PLA military leadership to 
decide foundational operational issues.
The level of trust the party extends to the 
military leadership in strategy development 
is only one of a number of arguments 
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that will be both new to most readers 
and controversial to specialists. While 
granting the significant influence of the 
Soviet Union on PLA development, Fravel 
offers a nuanced view of Soviet influence 
on PLA doctrine. During the 1950s, the 
Soviet Union provided extensive support 
to China, offering both military hardware 
and advisers. Despite this close relation-
ship, the 1956 strategic guidance was 
developed in part to articulate a specifically 
Chinese approach to warfare. While Soviet 
doctrine emphasized abrupt and aggressive 
offensive action, China remained mindful 
that it would be fighting from a position of 
relative weakness, so therefore at the opera-
tional level it focused instead on a dynamic 
transition between offense and defense.
Fravel also notes that “people’s war”—a 
powerful idea in Chinese Communist 
ideology—was never officially a central 
PLA military doctrine; rather, the PLA 
used guerrilla warfare only in areas where 
mobile forces could not be sustained. The 
phrase people’s war properly referred to 
the political integration of Communist 
military forces with the population, 
whether those forces were guerrilla bands 
or armored columns. Fravel also provides 
the best explanation yet of the lineage 
and significance of the concept of active 
defense, noting that Mao used the phrase 
as early as 1935. Active defense was an 
element of all nine strategic guidelines, 
and PLA officers still cite it today as 
an essential element of their strategy.
While the book covers the period from 
1949 to 1993 extensively, the treatment 
of PLA doctrine after 1993 consists of 
only nineteen pages. The PLA issued new 
strategic guidelines in 2004 and 2014, 
but Fravel assesses that these did not 
represent a basic shift in PLA approach. 
Given the relative scarcity of sources 
on more-recent PLA developments, 
and the fact that strategic changes take 
time to become apparent in forces, this 
view could be subject to reassessment 
in coming years. Nuclear strategy is 
covered in a separate but well-crafted 
section at the end of the book, reflect-
ing Fravel’s assessment that nuclear 
policy never was delegated to the PLA 
and thus represents a distinct topic.
With its focus on the long-term develop-
ment of Chinese military strategy, Active 
Defense does not offer quick and easy 
insights into current PLA operations. 
Although Fravel does an admirable 
job of balancing academic depth with 
approachable overviews of complex 
historical events, this is not the first book 
a student should read on the PLA. It is, 
however, an extraordinary work that will 
endure as essential reading for any serious 
student of Chinese military issues.
DALE C. RIELAGE
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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